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In the

Stlpt·e~ne

Cottrt of tl1c

State of Utal1

FLORENCE BUCKLEY.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
STANLEY COX and ALICE T. COX,
his wife, and KARL COX,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 7730

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
This suit was brought in the court below by the plaintiff, Florence Buckley, against the defendants, Stanley Cox
and Alice T. Cox, his wife, and Karl Cox, for damages
caused by defendants' unlawful use of a driveway on plaintiff's premises in Provo, Utah, and the complaint prayed
for a restraining order against the continued unlawful use
of the driveway and also for an order quieting title thereto in the plaintiff. We deem is necessary to supplement
the statement made by appellants in their brief in order
to more clearly show the claims of the parties and the
findings and judgment of the trial court.
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SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT

The plaintiff in count one of her complaint claims ownership of a home and premises situated at 914 North University Avenue in Provo, Utah, the same being described
by metes and bounds; that the North 12 feet of plaintiff's
premises is used for a driveway by means of which plaintiff gets in and out of the rear of her premises; that for
the past 3 years the defendants have violated the plaintiff's
rights by using the driveway so as to deprive her of the
use of her property to her damage; that although plaintiff
has demanded that the defendants cease such use, they
refuse and persist in so using the driveway and threaten
to continue to do so; that unless restrained defendants will
continue such harassing use of plaintiff's driveway, which
is doing plaintiff irreparable damage for which she has no
adequate remedy at law, and that plaintiff has sustained
$1,000.00 damages.
In count two of the complaint plaintiff reiterates her
ownership of the premises, including the driveway, and
further claims that defendants' claim an adverse interest
which is inferior to that of the plaintiff and without right
or title to the same (JR 3-6).
Defendants in their answer to count one of plaintiff's
complaint admit plaintiff's ownership of the home and the
premises immediately South of the home owned by defendants Stanley Cox and Alice T. c·ox, but claim there is
a driveway 12 feet wide between the two properties, which
defndants use and will continue to use unless restrained;
defendants claim that the North line of the plaintiff and
the South line of the defendants' properties is the middle
line of the driveway and has been so maintained for more
than 20 years; that defendants and their predecessors have
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used the same as a joint d.rive\vay for more than 30 years
adversely to the plaintiff and under claim of right; defendants admit the uses that plaintiff claimed they had made
of the drive\vay for 22 years prior to this suit and that
their predecessors used same for 10 years before that; defendants claim further that plaintiff "consented" to such
use by defendants until within the last 3 years; and the
use by plaintiff of her home as claimed by her, the location
of the driveway from her residence and the written demand
that the defendants cease using the driveway is admitted
by defendants. They deny the plaintiff's injury is irreparable and that she has suffered the claimed damages.
Defendants admit, deny and allege in their answer to
count two substantially as they did to count one.
Defendants Stanley Cox and Alice T. Cox counterclaim, alleging joint O\vnership of the premises known as
942 North University Avenue in Provo, Utah, describing
the same by metes and bounds; defendants claim that the
South 6 feet and the 6 feet immediately South thereof is
a joint driveway and appurtenant to plaintiff's and defendants' property; and that plaintiff claims an interest in the
driveway adverse to the defendants which is inferior to defendants' claims (JR 7-10).
In her reply plaintiff denied the affirmative claims
made by defendants in their answer, admits that defendants Stanley Cox and Alice T. Cox own the property described in their counterclaim and specifically denies that
the metes and bounds description there set forth is correct and denies the other allegations of the countercl.aim
(JR 11-13).
The issues drawn by the foregoing pleadings upon
which the case was tried were twofold:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1) Have the defendants title to any part of the
driveway, or does defendants' South line extend to the center of the 12-foot driveway in question?
(2) Have defendants and their predecessors used
the disputed driveway adversely to the plaintiff under claim
of right for more than 20 years?
Upon these issues the case was tried to the court and
the respective parties adduced evidence in support of their
respective claims. The court decided in favor of plaintiff
generally, except plaintiff was not allowed any damages,
and against the claims of the defendants. Accordingly, findings, conclusions, and judgment were duly entered (JR
15-23).
From an order denying defendants' motion ·to amend
findings, conclusions, and judgment and for a new trial,
defendants appeal ( JR 26-29), and assailed findings numbered 2, 8, 9a, 9b, He, and 9d, as being unsupported by the
evidence; also claiming that the findings and conclusions
are insufficient to support the judgment and that the court
err:ed in denying the motion for a new trial and in entering
judgment against the defendants (A. Br. 7-9).
The issues raised by this appeal are:
(1) Is there any substantial, competent evidence in
the record which supports the assailed findings? and
(2) Did the court properly apply the law to facts
found in granting judgment to the plaintiff?
We shall first briefly reply to the argument made by
appellants in their brief and then discuss the issues raised
in the order above indicated.
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THE ARGUMENT
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS IN REBUTTAL OF
THE ARGUMENT MADE BY DEFENDANTS IN THEIR
BRIEF.
Defendants spend 4~ :2 pages of their brief (A. Br. 3-7)
detailing certain of the testin1ony of certain witnesses who
testified in the trial of the case. Ohvious.ly the testimony
referred to is that most favorable to the defendants' contentions. This same evidence was referred to by defendants' counsel in argument before the trial court at the close
of the case. This testimony, ·along \Vith all the evidence
in the case, was considered by the trial court before making his decision. Indeed, the trial court's findings, conclusions, and judgment were made ~after weighing all the evidence and undoubtedly by giving greater credence to that
supporting the plaintiff's claims. The indication by defendants of evidence most favorable to their claim does not establish defendants' contentions on this appeal that the evidence on the whole record is insufficient to support · the
court's findings.
Defendants open their argument with the contention
that the plaintiff knew defendants adversely claimed the
right to use the driveway and that this situation continued
by plaintiff's "sufferance" for ·more than 20 years (A. Br.
9). Our answer to this claim is that defendants have seized
upon bits of evidence from the record which were not believed by the court before the findings were made.
Defendants then move on to their point one and say.
"The evidence is conclusive that the North 3.9 feet of the
drive\vay is not within the description of the premises set
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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forth in paragraph 1 of the findings." Again we point out
that this is not the case and that defendants have again
seized upon one bit of evidence in the record and have
failed to consider all the evidence which the trial court considered in making a finding the exact opposite from defendants' contention. For example, in support of this contention plaintiff cites the witness Beazer (Tr. 61) who there
testified that from the description of plaintiff's property,
as it appears in finding 1, the point of beginning is thro-vvn
3.9 feet South of the survey line between plaintiff's and defendants' properties. Defendants fail, however, to indicate Beazer's testimony on redirect examination (Tr. 6263) and the testimony of George S. Ballif (Tr. 37-65) ,
which establish the fact that there is no 3.9-foot gap on
the North of plaintiff's property and that her North line
coincides with the South line of the defendants. This is
principally found to be true by both Beazer and Balli£ because in the description, to which reference is made in
finding 1, there is also the clarifying call that "said point
of beginning being on the South line of the Stanley Cox
land." The court considered all of the evidence in this matter and made the assailed finding number 2, which we submit is well supported by the great preponderance of the
evidence.
Defendants then argue collectively all of their other
points, except point 11, and generally contend that the
"findings on which the judgment is based that defendants
have not established a right to the driveway either as joint
owner or by adverse possession" are insufficient. After
stating the rule as to the establishment of an easement by
prescription, the argument proceeds as follows:
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(a) Because defendant Cox and defendants' witness
Taylor testified favorably to defendants' claim (A. Br.
10)'

(b) Because the plaintiff testified (A. Br. 11) that
defendants' use of the drive,vay was made by "sufferance"
on the part of plaintiff and one of the definitions given in
vVebster's Dictionary contains the words "forbearance under provocation," even though the plaintiff, as part of her
asnwer, also stated that the use was "by permission", (Indeed, Webster's New International Dictionary, reference
history edition (1925), defines sufferance as indicated
above and also in the next paragraph as "negative consent
by not forbidding or hindering; toleration; permission; allowance; leave.'')
(c) And because this court has held that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than his cross-examination.
That because of the foregoing, therefore, the finding
that the defendants had not used the driveway adversely
to the plaintiff constitutes error.
In answer we call attention again to the fact that the

court has considered all of the evidence and has evidently
believed that which sustains plaintiff's claims and disbelieved much of that given to support defendants' claims.
The plaintiff on her cross-examination cleared up any doubt
the court may have had in his mind with respect to her
giving permission to defendants to use the driveway in her
testimony quoted by defendants in their brief (Tr. 35) .
This whole question was for the court, inasmuch as neither
party demanded a jury, and the Novback case (A. Br. 12)
sustains that view.
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rrhe defendants throw in at this point the argument
that "probably" the defendants' North line is determined
by an old fence established there before defendants acquired their property. We cannot believe that this argument is seriously made because there is no issue or evidence in the case at bar as to the North boundary other
than the survey line shown on plaintiff's Exhibit "C.".
The final contention made by defendants in their argument is point 11, that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to support the judgment. This
argument is made on the defendants' claim that the description doesn't cover the North 3.9 feet of the driveway.
As we have indicated above, the great preponderance of
the evidence shows that the North line of plaintiff's property and the South line of defendants' property coincide,
as shown by the survey line of same in plaintiff's E·xhibit
"C".
II. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WHICH SUPPORTS THE
ASSAIUED FINDINGS.
The findings of the trial court of which the defendants complain on this appeal may be summarized as follows: That the North 12 feet of plaintiff's described land
. is a driveway owned by her and used by her to gain access
to the rear of her property from University Avenue (JR
61); and that the claims of the defendants to the plaintiff's land are inferior to the claims of the plaintiff, and defendants have no estate, right, title, or interest therein
(JR-17).

The affirmative allegations of defendants' answer and
counterclaim were found by the trial court to be untrue
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as follo\vs: That it is untrue that the North line of plaintiff's land and the South line of defendants' land is the
middle line of the drive\vay; that it is untrue that said
drive\vay line has been agreed upon and maintained as the
division line for 20 years; that it is untrue that defendants and predecessors have used same as a joint driveway
for 30 years preceding the commencement of this action;
that it is untrue that defendants' use of the driveway has
been under claim of right and adverse to the plaintiff's
claim; that it is untrue that defendants have driven trucks,
auton1obiles, and \Valked over the said driveway for 22
years and their predecessors for 10 years before that; and
that it is untrue that such use by defendants of the joint
drive\vay \Vas consented to by plaintiff and, until within
the last 3 years, plaintiff never requested defendants not
to use same but on the contrary claimed it was the joint
driveway of plaintiff and defendants (JR 17-19).
It is further found that it is untrue that defendants
O\vn the South 6 feet of plaintiff's driveway or that it is
a joint driveway or appurtenant to defendants' property;
and that it is untrue that plaintiff's claim to the driveway
is inferior to the rights and claims of the defendants thereto (JR 19).
The defendants having assailed these findings as not
being supported by the evidence, and this being a law case,
the followng la\V established by Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U.
481, 39 P2d 1070, 1072, is applicable:
"These findings are challenged by defendants,
who claim that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant such findings thus made by the court. This being a law case (Norback v. Board of Directors, etc.,
84 U. 506, 37 P. (2d) 339), this court is not permitted
under the Constitution or the statutes to weigh the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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evidence. If there is any substantial competent evidence in the record to support the court's findings or
the verdict of the jury, the judgment will not be dis- ·
turbed in the absence of some error of law prejudicial
to appellant. Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah, 307, 231
P. 112; Brown v. Union Pac. R. ~Co., 76 Utah, 475, 290
P. 759. With this standard in mind we shall briefly
review the evidence upon which the trial court made
its findings."
In that case, as in the instant case, defendants claimed
an easernent by prescription over plaintiff's ground and
the court made findings for plaintiff, and the defendants
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support them.
The court reviewed the evidence by the above quoted standard and finding substantial competent evidence supporting the findings, they were sustained.
Applying this law to the instant case, let us briefly
review the evidence upon which the trial court made the
assailed findings:
The plaintiff, Florence Buckley, testified that she has
lived in the home on the premises at 914 North University
Avenue in Provo, Utah, which she now owns, for more
than 50 years (Tr. 3); that she knows the premises adjoining her place on the North and the Coxs and Taylors
who have occupied these premises since about 1924 (Tr.
4, 5, and 9); that the driveway in question is about 12 feet
wide and runs East from University Avenue on plaintiff's
premises (Tr. 6-8) ; that the said driveway was established
by plaintiff's father and has been in its present location
for at least 50 years and was the only way of getting into
plaintiff's place (Tr. 6); that there is a hedge along the
plaintiff's North boundary, planted by Taylor when he
lived on defendants' property in about 1925, and it was
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there \vhen defendants moved on their premises in 1927
(Tr. 8-9); that plaintiff's father built the home on plaintiff's premises in 1898 and the plaintiff acquired the premises from her father's estate in 1938 (Tr. 3, 4, and 5) ; that
the drive\vay \vas used by plaintiff and her folks to bring
coal and hay into the rear of the permises and plaintiff's
father gave her uncle permission to use same to bring coal
into his coal shed (Tr. 11-13); that when Taylor moved
on defendants' premises plaintiff gave .him permission to
use the drive\vay (Tr. 12-13); that \vhen defendants, in
1927, moved on the adjoining premises plaintiff gave Cox
permission to use the driveway, and Cox, as consideration
therefor, helped plaintiff pay for cementing the approach
from University Avenue to the driveway, and c·ox used it
to bring his coal in until he established a driveway on the
North side of his home (Tr. 13-14); that after defendants
established the driveway on the North side of their land
they didn't use plaintiff's driveway for a number of years
(Tr. 14-15) and that defendants first started to claim the
right to use plaintiff's driveway adversely to her in the
summer of 1948, and that the defendants never claimed the
right to do so before that time (Tr. 15-18).
George S. Balli£ qualified as an expert in title examinations and testified that he examined the Abstract of
Title to plaintiff's property, which contained a boundary
deed wherein defendants' property is described, and found
title vested in the plaintiff (Tr. 37-39); and that the legal
description of the plaintiff's property contained in the Abstract ties into and coincides with the legal description
contained in defendants' deed and establishes the boundary
bet\veen the t\vo properties, it being the North line of the
plaintiff's and the South line of the defendants' respective
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properties (Tr. 39-44). (Exhibit "A" is the Abstract and
was received in evidence).
William A. Beazer, having qualified as an expert ]and
surveyor, testified that he ~made a survey and established
the boundary line between the respective properties of
plaintiff and defendants, tying the same to the Northeast
corner of Section 1, and that he made a plat showing same,
plaintiff's Exhibit "C", which shows the said boundary
line to run along the middle of the hedge (Tr. 52-56); and
that the surveyor established and described the lines run
on the said map, and Exhibit "C" was received in evidence
reflecting the result of the survey (Tr. 57-59).
Clark Newell testified that he has known plaintiff and
the premises in question, including the driveway, for 45
or 50 years, and has kept cows there and has used the
pasture to the East (Tr. 135); that gates separated the
driveway from the pasture to the East and when the hay
was taken to the barn the gates had to be opened and these
gates were taken down by him in 1940 (Tr. 136-138); that
over all the time he has known the driveway he has never
seen the defendants use it or do anything ,to improve it nor
has he seen any car belonging to defendants standing on
it (Tr. 138-140); and there never was any turn into defendants' property along the North side of the driveway
(Tr. 140).
Fred J. Richin testified that he had known plaintiff
and the premises, including the driveway, for more than
50 years, and has never observed defendants using the
driveway during that time until 1948 or 1949 (Tr. 146),
nor clean nor make any improvements thereon (Tr. 148).
Ernest F. Buckley testified that he is 81 years of age
and has lived on the plaintiff's premises since his father
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built the home there, and that he has lived there continuously for the last 25 years and is acquainted with the drive\vay and the defendants, and over that period he never saw
defendants' cars in the drive\vay until a couple of years
ago when the trouble began (Tr. 151); that there was no
trouble about the drive\vay before that time because the
defendants didn't use the drive\vay enough and he never
saw defendants haul sand, gravel, or cinders on it, and
that he and his sister cleaned the driveway (Tr. 152-153).
Such then is the plaintiff's evidence upon which the
trial court made the challenged findings. As was said by
this court in Jensen v. Gerrard, supra, page 1072:
"As this is a law action, the question is not whether the evidence would have supported the decision in
favor of the appellants, but whether the decision made
by the trial court finds support in the evidence. If
there is competent credible evidence to support the
findings made by the trial court, then those findings
should stand . . . . .''
We submit that the assailed findings are supported by
substantial, competent, credible evidence and they should,
therefore, be sustained.

TIL THE CO,URT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW
TO THE FACTS FO·UND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
The case turned on defendants' claim that they had
a prescriptive right to use the driveway in question. The
evidence was in conflict on this point and the trial court
fo~nd in favor of plainrtff and against defendants. In so
doing, the court properly applied the law. We believe that
the controlling lavv applicable to the case at bar is set forth
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in Jensen vs. Gerrard, supra. In that case this court laid
down the law as to the burden of proof, the requisites of
prescription and the presumption which arises, in the following language:
"Since the defendants claimed the right to use
the roadway by prescription, the ·burden was upon
them to establish such claim by· clear and satisfactory
evidence.
(Citing 2 Tiffany on Real Property (2d Ed.) Sec. 519,
p. 2046; 19 C. J. 958, Sec. 181; I Jones' Comm. on Evid.
522.)
". . . . . Before a right of way can be acquired
by prescription, the use for the prescriptive period
must be peaceable, continuous, open, adverse as of
right, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
plaintiff and his grantors and predecessors in interest.
Actual notice to the owner of the servient etate is not
necessary if the user is so notorious that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the owner should learn
thereof; then he will have constructive notice of the
user which is sufficient.
(Citing Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah, 74, 287 P. 622; Bolton v. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591, 127 P. 355; Crosier v.
Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S. E. 326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.)
174; Gardner v. Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40 S. E. 271,
Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843,
35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941; Watson v. Board of County Commissioners, 38 Wash. 662, 80 P. 201; 2 Tiffany on Real
Property (2d Ed.,) Sec. 521).
"A twenty-year use alone of a way is not sufficient to establish an easement. Mere use of a roadway opened by a landowner for his own purpose \Viii
be presumed permissive. An antagonistic or adverse
use of a vvay cannot spring from a permissive use. A
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prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse \vhen it rests upon a license or mere
neighborly accon1modation. Adverse user is the antithesis of permissive user. If the use is accompanied
by any recognition in express terms or by implication
of a right in the lando,vner to stop such use now or at
some time in the future, the use is not adverse."
(Citing 2 Tiffany, supra, Sec. 519; Horne v. I--Iopper,
72 Colo. 434, 211 P. 665; Eddy v. Demichelis, 100 Cal.
App. 517, 280 P. 389).
The defendants failed to sustain the burden of proof
as required by law to establish a prescriptive right to the
use of the drive\vay measured by the foregoing necessary
requisites of the law.
The driveway was established by the plaintiff's father
more than 50 years ago over his own land for "his own purpose" and the convenient use thereof. This use was continued by the plaintiff after she acquired the title. What
use the defendants and their predecessors made of the
drive\vay over the past 30 years is presumed, under the
doctrine of the Gerrard case, to be permissive. :Certainly
defendants adduced no evidence to overcome such a presumption. Plaintiff's evidence shows that as soon as defendants began asserting title adversely to the plaintiff in
1948, the plaintiff denied their claims and continued to
do so until this lawsuit resulted.
The Gerrard case has been approved and followed in
the following late Utah cases:
Savage v. Nielsen (Utah, 1948) 197 P2d 117, 123.
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County Poultry
Growers Assn. (Utah, 1949) 209 P2d 251, 256.
Sdrales v. Rondos (Utah, 1949) 209 P2d 562, 565.
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See also cases supporting this rule in 170 A.L .. R. 825.
These cases are conclusive of the law applicable to the case
at bar, and the court correctly applied the same here.
CONCLUSIO·N
The challenged findings being supported by substantial competent evidence; the trial court having properly ap~
plied the law of the case to the facts found; we submit that
the findings and conclusions support the judgment of the
court below and the same should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALUIF,
BALLIF & EGGERTSEN,
Attorneys for Respondents
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